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FOREWORD
In April 1996, the Army War College's Strategic Studies
Institute held its Seventh Annual Strategy Conference. This
year's theme was, "China into the 21st Century: Strategic Partner
and . . . or Peer Competitor." The author of the following
monograph, Dr. Robert S. Ross, of Harvard University's Fairbank
Center for East Asian Research, argues that Japan's relationship
with China is a key element in the evolving East Asian security
structure. From Beijing's perspective, China's Japan policy
rivals its relationship with the United States in relative
strategic importance. Japan's economic strength and its potential
military power make it a major factor in Chinese security
calculations.
Many of the same factors that affect Sino-American relations
and Sino-Russian relations are integral to the relationship
between Beijing and Tokyo. Among these are Chinese treatment of
dissidents, the Taiwan issue, economic investment, and Japanese
military policy and strategy. Today Japanese and Chinese
interests compete in many areas, requiring tolerance, patience
and diplomatic sophistication to keep competition from evolving
into conflict. In the future, these challenges are likely to grow
in complexity.
Perhaps as a legacy of the Cold War, those of us in the
strategic analysis community on this side of the Pacific tend to
see the world in terms of bilateral relationships with the
United States. Professor Ross's thoughtful monograph illustrates
the greater complexity of international interactions. In this
century, the United States has faced tremendous challenges in
East Asia, with conflict erupting into warfare with both China
and Japan. For that reason alone, Professor Ross's essay warrants
a close reading by strategists and policymakers alike.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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MANAGING A CHANGING RELATIONSHIP:
CHINA'S JAPAN POLICY IN THE 1990s
Introduction.
China's Japan policy is a central component of China's
overall security policy, rivaling the U.S.-China relationship in
importance. As both an economic and potential military great
power, Japan has the ability to make a significant contribution
to Chinese security. It can contribute to Chinese economic
development and become a partner in managing regional security
issues in the interest of stability in East Asia and their
respective national interests. Alternatively, over the longer
term, Japan has the ability to become a major threat to vital
Chinese interests. Should Sino-Japanese security relations
deteriorate, Tokyo could deny China access to its economic
resources, including the Japanese market, and its capital and
technology, and it could influence other countries in East Asia
to do the same. This would have a significant impact on Chinese
economic development and Beijing's long-term military
modernization program. Japan could also participate in a regional
coalition aimed at China and, most alarming, if it realized its
considerable offensive military potential, it could directly
influence the regional balance of power and regional diplomacy to
China's strategic detriment.
China has a lot at stake in Sino-Japanese relations. To
maximize the benefits and minimize the prospects for adverse
trends, Beijing must carefully manage the relationship, seeking
to consolidate cooperative trends, to avoid the development of
unnecessary conflict, and to minimize the impact of basic
conflict of interests. Simultaneously, without undermining its
cooperative efforts toward Japan, Beijing must also develop the
domestic resources necessary to contend with an economically,
technologically, and militarily more capable Japan; it has to
play catch-up to a potential great power threat. Finally, Chinese
policymakers must pay close attention to contemporary trends in
Japanese foreign and defense policy, including policy toward
China, assessing the impact of changing Japanese policy on
Chinese security interests. In response, they must develop a
nuanced policy that discourages detrimental trends in Japanese
policy while not undermining the prospects for bilateral
cooperation.
The challenges of China's Japan policy are considerable.
Even under the best of circumstances, Chinese leaders would be
hard-pressed to develop a Japan policy that could satisfy these
competing demands. Yet, contemporary circumstances make the task
all the more difficult. Recent developments in Chinese relations
with Taiwan and the United States impact Japanese foreign policy,
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and domestic politics in Beijing and Tokyo complicate the process
of sustaining nuanced foreign policies and cooperative bilateral
relations. It is far from clear that, in these complex
circumstances, Chinese policymakers have either the diplomatic
skill or the political flexibility to meet the challenge of
sustaining Sino-Japanese cooperation.
Japan, Multipolarity, and the 21st Century.
Chinese leaders share the global appreciation for the
reduced tensions of the post-Cold War era. As much as any other
country, China contributed to the positive outcome of the Cold
War, and it welcomes the opportunity to end the high level
military readiness and economic dislocations associated with the
Soviet threat and to focus its scarce domestic resources on
economic development.
Nonetheless, Chinese leaders also share in the widespread
apprehension that the current relief from high levels of
international tension may be short-lived. They do not believe
that power politics has ended or that there is any guarantee that
there will be long-term stability in international politics or
great power relations. As Premier Li Peng explained in his March
1996 Report on the Work of the Government to the National
People's Congress, "The world . . . is still full of
contradictions. Hegemonism and power politics are the roots of
instability in the world."1 This attitude was repeated by a
senior Chinese journalist, who explained that looking toward the
21st century, "all is not well in the world. Hegemonism and power
politics will remain the principal barriers to . . . peace and
stability."2
A key component of this perspective is the shifting
relations among the great powers in the transition to a
multipolar balance of power in East Asia. While acknowledging
that the United States is the only superpower, Chinese
policymakers understand that uneven rates of change among the
great powers will gradually produce a more equitable regional
distribution of power in the 21st century. Once again, Li Peng
described well the Chinese perspective, arguing that "the world
is developing toward multipolarization at an accelerating pace."3
A retired senior Chinese diplomat observed that since the end of
the Cold War, "the world has been moving with a dizzying pace
toward multipolarity."4 In this evolving situation, international
conflict and cooperation will be determined by great power
relations. "In a multipolar world, the single superpower and the
many powers may cooperate when their interests collide, and clash
when their interests conflict."5 In the 21st century, the great
powers "will engage in mutual competition, mutual restraint, and
mutual cooperation."6
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Central to China's understanding of East Asian security in
the 21st century is its assessment of Japan's likely future role
in the multipolar balance of power. The Chinese perceive Japan as
a rising power determined to play a major independent role in the
regional balance. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen observed that
Japan "is not reconciled to being only an economic power but
hopes to play a major role as a big power in international
affairs."7 Chen Peiyao, director of the Shanghai Institute of
International Studies, argues that Japan aims to become the
economic and political leader of East Asia and has started to
compete actively with the United States for regional influence.8
Chinese analysts also point to Japan's increasing effort to
become a permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security
Council and its growing military participation in U.S.
peacekeeping activities, including its participation in the UN
intervention in Cambodia, as evidence of its political
ambitions.9
Compounding Chinese concern regarding Japanese intentions is
its appraisal of Japanese capabilities. Japanese great power
economic capabilities are well known. Japanese business has
become the importance source of new direct foreign investment for
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries,
displacing the American role as the primary source of industrial
growth for such countries as Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
Japan also makes an important contribution to economic
development and continued growth in Taiwan. Tokyo's regional
economic influence can readily translate into political
influence, potentially enabling Japan to influence the foreign
policies of many East Asian countries.
More significant, however, than Japanese economic influence
is its potential military capability. Chinese leaders frequently
point out that power in the 21st century will increasingly rest
on comprehensive national strength, and that economic and
technological capabilities are central to the development of such
power. Yet, the implications of this analysis are not only that
economic capabilities will play an increasing role in great power
competition, but also that technological and economic
capabilities will be increasingly important in determining the
strategic balance of power and the outcome of military
competition. Certainly, the display of U.S. capabilities during
the Gulf War revealed the post-Cold War continued importance both
of military power and of technology in producing such power.
Thus, Ding Henggao, head of China's Commission on National
Defense, Science, Technology and Industry, pointed out that: "The
explosive growth of modern technology is having an increasingly
profound impact on military affairs"10 and that defense S&T
(science and technology) "plays an irreplaceable role in boosting
China's defense capability and comprehensive national strength."11
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Chinese leaders are convinced that military capabilities
will play a decisive role in great power relations and that
Japan, despite its relationship with the United States and
domestic political and societal restraints on military activism,
is well positioned to be a formidable military great power.
Japan's military acquisition program makes clear that Japan
"harbors a strong desire to play a bigger military role in the
world."12 Although Japan has not developed significant offensive
capabilities, the steady increase in its defense budget since the
late 1970s has produced a modern and formidable defense
establishment.13 Apart from the United States, Japan has more
major warships than any other Asian country and any European
member of NATO. It already deploys in Asia more submarines,
escort ships and mine warfare units than the United States;
indeed, after the U.S. Seventh Fleet completes its scheduled
downsizing, Japan will have more major vessels in East Asia than
the United States. Moreover, this is a new and modern navy,
having been built in the last 15 years. Almost all of Japan's
naval vessels are constructed and equipped with highly advanced
technology, such as Aegis technology. Finally, Japan already
possesses the technology to build, support, and manage aircraft
carriers; it deployed aircraft carriers over 50 years ago during
World War II.14
Japan is also constructing an advanced air force. Based on
the technology of the U.S. F-16C/D, Japan's FSX will be far
superior to any aircraft that China can manufacture, and it will
be at least as capable as any aircraft China can import from
Russia or from anywhere else, but with the important advantage of
domestic production. Japan is also purchasing Airborne Warning
and Control System (AWACS) aircraft from the United States. Thus,
Japan possesses or is developing advanced conventional naval and
air capabilities based on weaponry and technology far superior to
that which China possesses or can look forward to developing
during the next decade.15
Finally, China is concerned by Japan's determination to
develop a sophisticated nuclear weapons program. Japan's interest
in plutonium-based nuclear reactors and its advanced-technology
civilian rocket program indicate Japanese possession of advanced
strategic nuclear capability. One Chinese report noted Japanese
stockpiling of plutonium and its acquisition of uranium
enrichment, commenting that the only use of such minerals and
technology is in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. It also
observed that the capability of Tokyo's nuclear delivery systems
rank Japan third, behind only the United States and Russia.16
Tokyo has also been developing the technology to construct
advanced nonstrategic missile systems with various ranges and
deployments. "Spin-ons" of Japanese civilian technology to
military uses is an important source of potential Japanese
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strategic power.17
This combination of Japanese economic resources and
strategic potential creates heightened Chinese concern for
Japan's future regional role. In many respects, Japan has the
ability to "turn on a dime." Moreover, unlike policymakers in the
United States and other western countries, Chinese leaders give
reduced weight to Japan's current reluctance to expand its
military role in world affairs. While acknowledging that domestic
opinion in Japan continues to restrain Tokyo's foreign policy
options, Chinese leaders have a longer historical perspective on
the role of domestic politics and culture on Japanese foreign
policy. Japan's occupation of China during the 1930s and 1940s
teaches that Japanese potential for domestic "militarism" can be
as influential as "pacifism" and that such "militarism" can lead
to regional instability with serious implications for Chinese
security.
Thus, as Chinese leaders look toward the 21st century, they
must be concerned about Japanese intentions. Indeed, not too long
ago most of the research analysts in China's Central Military
Commission reportedly concluded that Japan will become a major
military power and, in the context of continued Soviet weakness,
that it will target its strategy and capabilities against China,
"challenging China politically and militarily."18 It is thus
incumbent on Chinese leaders to develop a foreign policy toward
Japan that consolidates the foundation of Sino-Japanese
cooperation and that maximizes Tokyo's incentive to deemphasize
the military instruments of diplomacy.
Consolidating Cooperation.
In many respects, China can draw considerable confidence
from the current status of Sino-Japanese relations. For an
historically troubled relationship and one that has considerable
potential for heightened tension and conflict, the two sides have
developed foreign policies and a bilateral relationship that
suggests a long-term ability to manage and constrain the
inevitable competition that will develop between two great powers
in close proximity that are simultaneously developing expanded
economic, political and military roles in East Asia--their common
strategic backyard.
A crucial component of contemporary Sino-Japanese relations
that helps reassure Chinese leaders of the prospects for longterm stability and contributes to Chinese ability to prepare for
instability is bilateral economic cooperation. Sino-Japanese
economic relations can provide the capital and technology
required to modernize China's economy and defense capabilities.
Equally important, over the long term it can provide powerful
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economic and social incentives for leaders in both countries to
maintain cooperation and to find peaceful solutions to bilateral
conflicts. To the extent that interest groups develop in Japan
that benefit from Japanese participation in Chinese economic
development, they can encourage politicians to consider
compromise solutions to conflicts of interests. This dynamic is
apparent in U.S.-China relations, in which U.S. business
interests have been instrumental in the annual efforts by the
White House to maintain China's Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading
status. Economic cooperation can create a foundation for
cooperative relations which can exist amid developing political
conflict.
Recent trends in Sino-Japanese economic relations are
encouraging. Japan is China's largest trading partner. In 1995,
total merchandise trade increased to nearly U.S. $58 billion, a
nearly 25 percent increase over 1994; China's imports from Japan
grew by over 17 percent to nearly U.S. $22 billion. Chinese
exports to Japan play an important role in Beijing's efforts to
accumulate hard currency. Exports grew by 30 percent to nearly
U.S. $36 billion, yielding China a U.S.$14 billion trade surplus
with Japan.19 Although this trade surplus may create friction
with Japan, it is a manageable amount, especially insofar as
Japan continues to run an overall trade surplus.
China is also an important export market for Japanese
manufactured goods. In 1994, China was Japan's fifth largest
export market, significantly contributing to Japanese employment
and stable economic growth.20 In the future, the Chinese consumer
market should become increasingly important for Japan, as Chinese
economic development spreads beyond coastal cities and major
industrial centers, stimulating increased Chinese demand for
high-end imported consumer goods.
Especially important for the economic and political
relationship is the trend for Japanese investment in China.
Through the 1980s and early 1990s, Japanese investors showed
little interest in China. Through 1989, Japan had provided only 8
percent of the direct foreign investment in China and only 1
percent of Japan's total direct foreign investment and 6 percent
of its direct foreign investment in Asia.21 The dearth of
investment aroused suspicions in China over Japanese attitudes
toward China, particularly insofar as the minimal investment led
to little technology transfer.
This trend began a fundamental turnaround in 1992. Between
March 1992 and March 1993, new Japanese investment in China
increased by 87 percent over the previous year and three times
that of 1989-1990, while total Japanese overseas investment
dropped by 18 percent. By 1993, Japan had become the fourth
largest investor in China, surpassing Germany.22 Sino-Japanese
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investment relations took another positive turn in 1995. In the
first 6 months of 1995, actual Japanese capital input into China
increased nearly 48 percent over the same period in 1994. More
importantly, in 1995 large Japanese firms, including Matsushita,
NEC and Toyota, began investing in large-scale Chinese
manufacturing projects involving high-technology industries.23
Japanese capital is now beginning to make a significant
contribution to Chinese economic development. Moreover, this
trend has important implications for the Sino-Japanese political
relationship, creating a significant Japanese economic interest
in stable political relations.
Finally, Japan's important loan program to China also
contributes to Chinese economic development. Between 1979 and
1995, Japan's three yen loan packages for China amounted to
approximately 1.6 trillion yen. The annual interest rate for the
loans has been a mere 2.3 percent and China has 30 years to repay
the loans, with an additional 10 years of "deferment." In
preliminary negotiations for the fourth loan package covering
1996-1998, Tokyo agreed to loan Beijing an additional 580 billion
yen to help in the construction of 40 projects, including such
important infrastructure projects as airports and water supply
systems.24 In the aftermath of the February 1996 earthquake in
Yunnan province, Japan also offered China U.S.$300,000 in
emergency aid.25
Complementing the positive developments in trade relations
have been constructive developments in political relations. In
the aftermath of the June 1989 Tiananmen incident, Japan was the
advanced industrial country least inclined to allow ideological
considerations to interfere with bilateral ties. There was never
any question that Japan would continue to grant yen loans to
China and that trade relations would continue uninterrupted.
Since then, bilateral summitry has been a common development in
relations, including frequent trips back and forth by each
country's prime minister and a historic visit to Beijing by the
Japanese emperor. The dialogue in these meetings has been free of
the friction that so often characterizes meetings between U.S.
and Chinese diplomats, despite the existence of various SinoJapanese conflicts of interest.
The absence of ideological conflict has allowed Japan to
engage Chinese leaders in a regular security dialogue. Since the
two sides agreed to hold the security meetings in 1993, they have
held three such meetings, the most recent in January 1996. Prior
to the 1996 meeting, separate meetings had been held between
foreign ministry and defense department officials. In 1996, Tokyo
and Beijing held a joint session of diplomatic and defense
officials, including Chinese General Xiong Guankai. Annual, lowprofile meetings such as these offer regular opportunities for
each side to express concerns about the other's defense and

7

foreign policies, including trends in their respective defense
budgets.26 Bilateral dialogues can also be conducive to dealing
with specific issues. After tensions developed in January 1996,
in early March the Japanese and Chinese foreign ministers agreed
to open bilateral talks over economic development of the waters
surrounding the disputed Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands.27
New Directions in Sino-Japanese Relations.
The cooperative trends in Sino-Japanese relations have been
developing since the early stages of the post-Mao period, when
extensive economic, societal, and diplomatic contacts became
possible. Recent trends in Japanese security policy and in
Japan's China policy have begun to elicit growing concern in the
Chinese leadership. Chinese leaders must contend with what they
perceive to be the emergence of a potential countervailing trend
in Japanese foreign policy.
One aspect of this trend concerns U.S.-Japan security
cooperation. Chinese leaders clearly understand that U.S.-Japan
security cooperation plays an important role in restraining
Japanese military development. But should they conclude that the
post-Cold War U.S.-Japan relationship is moving from maintaining
the option for Tokyo and Washington of enhanced future
cooperation against an unidentified threat toward contemporary
strategic cooperation against China, Beijing would view U.S.Japan security cooperation with considerable alarm.
Beginning in early March 1995, following the release of the
1995 U.S. Defense Department report on the East Asia Strategic
Initiative, China began to express doubts about the direction of
the U.S.-Japan relationship. Among the various aspects of the
Pentagon report that aroused concern in Beijing was U.S. interest
in strengthening U.S.-Japan strategic cooperation and American
interest in bolstering specific Japanese defense capabilities.
Beijing expressed concern that in the post-Cold War era, now that
the Soviet threat had ended, America sought expanded strategic
cooperation with Japan. China wondered whether this new direction
in U.S.-Japan relations was in response to the "China threat" and
if it was aimed at "containing" China.28 Then, in February 1996,
in preparation for President William Clinton's April visit to
Tokyo, White House officials reportedly sought to include, in a
joint U.S.-Japan statement on security, a reference to Chinese
military modernization.30
This trend culminated in April 1996, when President Clinton
traveled to Tokyo for a U.S.-Japan summit, signed the U.S.-Japan
Joint Declaration on Security, and reached agreement on
Principles for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. The agreements
called for greater Japanese military responsibility in the
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alliance, including (for the first time) responsibility in joint
defense operations throughout Asia, suggesting to Chinese leaders
that the alliance could promote rather than inhibit the Japanese
defense build-up and be used against China. Chinese media argued
that the agreement was a "dangerous signal" that Japan has been
"brought into U.S. global strategy" and that the agreement will
"strengthen coordination with the actions of U.S. troops" in
Asia.30 It "gives the feeling" that the two countries "work handin-hand to dominate the Asia-Pacific region."31 The Chinese media
also argued that the expansion of Japanese military activities
"is bound to evoke the vigilance . . . against Japan's advance
toward becoming a military power," and that in the long run,
there is no doubt that the aim is to keep a close watch on
China.32
Coinciding with the initiative in U.S. policy toward Japan
has been a corresponding Japanese interest in bolstering its
relationship with the United States in response to the
development in Chinese power. Although concern for the Chinese
military is not as great in Japan as in the United States,
Chinese economic and defense modernization has elicited increased
Japanese attention. Chinese military maneuvers during the 1996
Taiwan Straits crisis elicited increased Japanese attention to
Chinese capabilities and led many Japanese to question the wisdom
of reducing the U.S. military presence on Japan.33 Coinciding with
these developments is the prospect for U.S.-Japan strategic
cooperation against Chinese security interests. In February 1996,
Tokyo and Washington agreed to conduct a study on theater missile
defense (TMD). Japanese sources also report that the United
States, to heighten Japanese security concerns and encourage
Japanese interest in cooperation with Washington on TMD, has
shared with Tokyo strategic intelligence on China's nuclear
capability.34 The Chinese have argued that an East Asian TMD would
be "clearly aimed at China." Should it be deployed, its primary
effect will be to "render ineffective" China's limited secondstrike nuclear capability, significantly enhancing Chinese
vulnerability to U.S. military power and to potential Japanese
nuclear capability. Chinese concern for the strategic
consequences of TMD in East Asia have led Beijing to issue a
warning that it would reconsider its commitment to participating
in a comprehensive test-ban treaty should such a system be
deployed.35
China still sees considerable positive elements in U.S.Japan cooperation. It is not opposed to the U.S.-Japan alliance
or to the U.S. military presence in Japan. It has not concluded
that the alliance is a net detriment to China's interests. On the
contrary, Beijing still considers U.S. security ties with Japan a
contribution to both Chinese security and regional stability, if
only because the alternative--an independent Japan providing for
its own defense--remains a far more daunting prospect. There is
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now simply greater Chinese ambivalence toward U.S.-Japan
relations and uncertainty concerning the outcome of the new trend
in security ties.
The second disconcerting element in Japanese foreign policy
is the new trend in Japan's China policy and the politics of
policy making in Japan. Similar to the new dynamic in U.S. policy
making, the demise of the Soviet Union reduced Tokyo's concern
for Sino-Japanese strategic cooperation and opened the domestic
debate in Japan over China policy. But perhaps even more
important was the end of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
domination of Japanese politics in early 1994. Chinese leaders
were not pleased with the emergence of true two-party politics in
Japan. Needless to say, Chinese communists are simply more
comfortable dealing with one-party governments. But more
important, Beijing was apprehensive over the impact of enhanced
electoral competition on Japanese foreign policy. China expressed
concern that Japanese politicians would have to appeal to mass
sentiment to win votes and that domestic politics would play a
increasingly significant role in Japanese policy making.36
Since that time, Tokyo's China policy has elicited increased
public debate, constraining the flexibility of Japanese
policymakers. Of greatest concern to China is the development in
Japan of a "Taiwan lobby." In mid 1995, after President Lee Tenghui visited Cornell University in the United States, the Japanese
government came under domestic pressure to allow the Taiwanese
leader to visit Japan. Japanese opposition politicians pressed
for the government to grant Lee a visa to visit Kyoto University,
his undergraduate institution, or to invite him or Taiwan Vice
Premier Hsu Lee-teh to attend the November 1995 Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Osaka. China warned that
any such visits would place the relationship "in the greatest
danger" and Chinese President Jiang Zemin promised to boycott the
APEC meeting should either Taiwanese leader attend.37 Ultimately,
Japan succumbed to Chinese pressure and Taiwan was represented
in Osaka by Ku Chen-fu, head of Taiwan's Straits Exchange
Foundation.
Nonetheless, the trend in Japanese politics was clear.
Throughout 1995, politicians from various political parties in
Japan were calling for enhanced Japanese-Taiwanese diplomatic
contacts. In response, Beijing criticized "pro-Taiwan forces" and
warned the Japanese government to oppose any pro-Taiwan
activities in Japan. When it seemed that a Japanese cabinet
member might participate in a pro-Taiwan demonstration, Beijing
made "solemn representations" with the Japanese Foreign
Ministry.38
Then, during the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, hard-line
members of the Liberal Democratic Party, reacting to China's
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military maneuvers, demanded that the Japanese government freeze
its yen loans to China. The Japanese Foreign Ministry has been
accused of being "weak-kneed" toward China, but in response to
the political pressure, the government was compelled to postpone
its talks with Beijing over the third round of Japanese yen
loans. Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda advised Chinese
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen that in reaction to Chinese nuclear
testing and its Taiwan policy, voices in Japan had called for a
review of loan program. 39 When asked about the prospect that
Japan might freeze the loans, China's foreign ministry spokesman
responded that China "would like to send a very clear and
unmistakable message to the Japanese side, which is that the
issue of Taiwan is purely an internal matter of China which
brooks no foreign intervention or interference of any kind."40
Nevertheless, the "Taiwan issue" is now embedded in Japanese
politics, adding an important element of uncertainty to SinoJapanese relations.
Japanese domestic politics have affected other aspects of
Japan's China policy. Japan's response to Beijing's nuclear
testing program has elicited Chinese concern. Faced with domestic
opposition to Japanese acquiescence to Chinese testing, in
September 1995 the Japanese government froze its grant aid to
China. Although the amount of the aid was relatively nominal and
China issued a low-key reaction, Chinese commentary pointed to
domestic forces in Japan that opposed Chinese modernization and
Sino-Japanese cooperation and expressed concern for the prospects
for the relationship.41
The recent tension between Japan and South Korea and Japan
and China over disputed islands may also reflect the influence of
Japanese domestic politics. In conjunction with its ratification
of the Law of the Sea, the Japanese government is under pressure
to formally establish a 200-mile economic zone around all
Japanese territory. The prospect of such legislation has led to
demonstrations throughout South Korea and tension in South
Korean-Japanese relations. Beijing's apparent response to
Japanese intentions was to send vessels to carry out short-term
trial oil drills in the vicinity of the Diaoyutai Islands. In so
doing, Beijing likely meant to reassert its claims to the
islands while, more quietly than South Korea, warning Japan to
avoid placing the dispute high on the bilateral agenda.42 Japan's
changing domestic environment will continue to contribute to
Chinese apprehension and uncertainty over the Japanese foreign
policy. Although Chinese leaders believe that Japanese
policymakers and leading politicians continue to place importance
on Sino-Japanese relations and wish to maintain cooperation with
China, they also understand that Japanese domestic political
instability is a potential source of policy change, insofar as
Japanese policymakers could allow political considerations to
determine policy. The Taiwan issue, economic relations and other
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bilateral issues could become hostage to Japanese partisan
politics.43
The combination of Japan's changing strategic relationship
with the United States and the politicization of China policy in
Japanese domestic politics creates an important element of
uncertainty in China concerning the future of Japanese foreign
policy, its implications for Chinese security, and for the course
of Sino-Japanese relations. How Chinese foreign policy responds
to these new challenges to Sino-Japanese relations will be
critical in determining the course of the relationship and the
politics of East Asia.
Managing a Changing Relationship.
China's impact on Japan's China policy falls into three
categories. The first is Beijing's strategic response to Japanese
capabilities and the trend in the bilateral balance of power. The
second is Beijing's response to immediate issues in the bilateral
relationship and to emerging trends in Japan's China policy. The
third category comprises those Chinese policies not necessarily
aimed at Japan but which impact Japan's China policy, including
policy toward third parties. In each case, the implications of
Chinese policy for bilateral relations and Chinese policy
alternatives need to be addressed.
China's most fundamental and long-term policy response to
the Japanese challenge is economic modernization and,
specifically, defense modernization. Beijing cannot but look at
Japan's technological and military superiority over China and the
prospect that the gap might actually widen before it begins to
narrow without considerable apprehension. From this perspective,
Chinese leaders express their true intention when they insist
that China needs a peaceful international environment in which to
modernize its economy and develop the foundation of comprehensive
national strength.44 The longer China can focus its scarce
domestic resources on economic modernization, the more secure it
will be if and when heightened tension returns to East Asian
politics.
But, while laying the economic foundation for national
security, Chinese leaders have also decided that they must begin
the process of military modernization. To wait to acquire modern
weaponry and reduce China's strategic vulnerability until the
security situation requires it would ensure Chinese strategic
inferiority when the weaponry is needed most. This is as true
for nuclear weaponry as it is for conventional weaponry, insofar
as the long-term survival of China's second-strike capability is
in doubt. Ding Henggao made this point when explaining why China
needs to modernize its defense capability:
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The grim reality is that in a world characterized by
turbulent international politics and fierce competition
in military high-tech, a nation that fails to work hard
to raise its level of defense S&T and upgrade its
defense capability . . . would find itself in a
vulnerable position once war breaks out, with
devastating effects on its national interests, national
dignity, and international prestige.45
What most concerned Ding was the long way that China's defense
capabilities had to go to meet world standards:
China's defense S&T has come a long way but still
trails the best in the world. To master modern
technology, especially to meet the demands of high-tech
war, we must overcome many hurdles, including the
shortage of funds, technology, and qualified personnel
. . . . the situation . . . compels us to work hard for
several years to bring our defense S&T and weaponry to
a level to meet the needs of future high-tech war.46
This strategic imperative drives China's increasing defense
budget, purchases of foreign weaponry (including advanced Russian
aircraft and naval vessels), and nuclear testing. Japan, as much
as any other country, could become China's strategic rival,
posing a daunting defense agenda for China's People's Liberation
Army (PLA). But China's strategic response to vulnerability also
contributes to Sino-Japanese friction, insofar as it elicits
Japanese fears of a "China threat," and the prospect of
transformed Japanese intentions, leading Japan to adopt those
very policies that China is trying to prevent. Embedded in
China's response to the imbalance in the Sino-Japanese
relationship is the potential for a self-fulfilling prophesy.
It is not clear how China's defense policy can ameliorate
this dilemma. China's 1996 budget calls for a modest (when
adjusted for the inflation rate) 10 percent increase in defense
spending.47 Nevertheless, as long as China's absolute defense
budget continues to increase by double-digit figures and the PLA
seeks foreign weaponry to correct its strategic vulnerability,
China's defense modernization efforts will attract attention in
Japan. This puts the burden of maintaining stable Sino-Japanese
relations and Japanese confidence in Chinese intentions on
Chinese diplomacy. It also requires that Chinese leaders manage
Sino-Japanese conflicts of interest with sufficient subtlety both
to protect Chinese interests and not elicit Japanese
apprehension.
China's response to the recent developments in Japanese
foreign policy and China policy has been to place increased
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pressure on Japan to reconsider its policy priorities. Much of
this pressure is reflected in greater Chinese media attention to
the potential for renewed "militarism" in Japan and to worrisome
developments in Japanese foreign policy. In the aftermath of the
Chinese government crackdown of the Beijing democracy movement on
June 4, 1989, Chinese scholars and journalists were instructed
not to write negative reports about Japan.48 In 1995, that
restriction was lifted and the Chinese media began an active
campaign against a wide range of Japanese behavior. Most
prominent was Chinese media coverage of the 50th anniversary of
the end of World War II, which relentlessly attacked the
atrocities of the Japanese occupation of China and ominously
warned of the potential for revived militarism in contemporary
Japan. But perhaps more important was Chinese coverage of
Japanese military capabilities. Until 1995, with the exception of
commentary on the size of the defense budget, there was a clear
restriction against any coverage of Japanese defense policy. In
1995, for the first time, Chinese analysts discussed Japan's
military capabilities and its advanced weaponry, including its
nuclear program. In so doing, China was not only signaling Japan
its concern for trends in Japanese defense policy, but also the
risk of heightened Sino-Japanese tension resulting from "China
threat" charges and corresponding changes in Japanese defense
policy. One Chinese report observed trends in Japanese defense
policy and warned that the "situation in Japan is somewhat
similar to that in pre-war Japan. What road will Japan take?-this question definitely cannot be ignored."49
Chinese use of the media is a convenient and low-profile
approach to general trends in Japanese foreign policy. More
difficult for Chinese diplomats to manage are specific Japanese
policy initiatives. One such issue is the territorial dispute in
Sino-Japanese relations. The Diaoyutai/Senkaku dispute has
existed since 1949, yet both countries have preferred to keep the
issue off the bilateral agenda. Ideally, China would ignore form
and focus on substance regarding the dispute, or simply respond
with similar legislation, which it will likely do in 1996. Yet
sensitivity to sovereignty issues seems to combine with
succession politics to compel a more active Chinese response.
Thus, Beijing dispatched a drilling vessel to the disputed
waters. Using its media, it also quietly sided with South Korea
in its conflict with Japan over the disputed island of
Tokto/Take, thus urging caution on Japanese handling of the SinoJapanese dispute.50 Nonetheless, these were low-key responses.
They did not involve either military vessels or public
recriminations requiring a Japanese response. Moreover, because
Japan has minimal interest in developing the waters around the
disputed islands, this should remain a manageable issue.51
Another issue requiring a Chinese response is Japan's
increasing desire to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security
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Council. It is clear that China is opposed to Japanese permanent
membership on the committee. China clearly prefers the current
situation, in which it has the advantage over Japan regarding
Security Council deliberations over regional issues. Moreover,
Beijing cannot look forward to the prospect of U.S.-Japan
cooperation in the Security Council. Thus, China frequently
asserts that it is not yet appropriate to consider Japanese
permanent membership on the Security Council. One discussion of
Security Council reform went so far as to assert that "it is
absolutely impermissible to grant the veto to newly admitted
permanent members."52
Beijing should be able to manage this issue, as well. China
has not drawn any lines in the sand and there remains a wideranging and inconclusive debate on UN reform, suggesting that the
issue may linger for awhile and that Beijing will not have to
take the lead in resisting far-reaching reform. Equally
important, should an international consensus emerge that Japan
should have permanent member status with the veto, Beijing would
most likely not stand in the way. Similarly, China appears to
have acquiesced to growing Japanese participation in UN
peacekeeping activities, despite the implications for Japanese
receptivity to the use of military instruments in diplomacy.53
Chinese leaders seem intent on preventing bilateral issues
from disrupting Sino-Japanese cooperation. Although China
continues to modernize the PLA, refuses to move off long-held
positions (such as sovereignty over disputed territories and
Japanese membership on the UN Security Council), and warns of the
consequences of revived Japanese "militarism," it has maintained
a low profile on Sino-Japanese disputes. There is evidence that
China understands the risks entailed in an overly contentious
Japan policy. But what is less clear is whether China can manage
the consequences for Sino-Japanese relations of third party
issues and nonforeign policy issues.
The factors affecting Japan's China policy are not limited
to Chinese policy toward Japan and Chinese defense policy.
China's mere size and proximity to Japan ensures that various
aspects of Chinese politics and foreign policy will be
contentious issues in Japanese politics and that Japanese
policymaking will reflect the political considerations of
Japanese leaders contending for power in an uncertain electoral
environment. Moreover, many of these issues are not readily
amenable to Chinese diplomatic management.
China's human rights policies could destabilize SinoJapanese relations. Renewed violent repression of dissent in
China in the post-Deng period or even simply excessive
authoritarian policies in Hong Kong after 1997 would likely
elicit far greater public outcry and political and policy
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repercussions in Japan than did the June 4th tragedy. The
Japanese public is increasingly disinclined to be tolerant of
Chinese human rights violations, and Japanese politicians are
increasingly disinclined to ignore voter sentiment in
policymaking.
Chinese conflict with third parties will also affect
Japanese attitudes toward China. Taiwan's foreign policy and U.S.
policy toward Taiwan, themselves susceptible to recurring
domestic instability in all three parties, may well determine the
trend in cross-Straits relations, eliciting additional mainlandTaiwan crises which could undermine support in Japan for
cooperative relations with China and for restraint in Japanese
defense policy. Insofar as Taiwan is the mainland's most
important foreign policy issue, it will be difficult for Chinese
leaders to moderate policy toward Taiwan to maintain cooperative
relations with Japan. Should U.S.-China relations deteriorate due
to heightened conflict over any of the numerous conflicts of
interest in U.S.-China relations, Japan will come under increased
pressure to cooperate with U.S. policy and to contribute to
American efforts to "contain" China. Yet, U.S.-China relations
are equally unpredictable and potentially unmanageable,
influenced as much by American domestic politics, third party
issues, and U.S. policy on a wide range of bilateral conflicts of
interests as by Chinese behavior. Equally troublesome for SinoJapanese relations could be conflict between China and the other
claimants to the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.
Insofar as heightened conflict would suggest Chinese expansionism
along the shipping lanes to Persian Gulf oil, support would
likely grow in Japan for greater strategic cooperation with the
United States.
On the other hand, enhanced cooperation between China and
third parties, which China does have considerable ability to
control, could also influence Sino-Japanese relations. Of
particular importance is Sino-Russian relations. The combination
of potential Sino-Japanese conflict with ongoing Japanese-Russian
rancor over the Northern Territories and lack of economic
cooperation prepares Japan to see "collusion" in Sino-Russian
relations. In this respect, Beijing must be sensitive to the
effect of growing cooperation between China and Russia, including
Russian arms sales to China and close ties between the civilian
and military leaderships, on Japanese policymaking. Although less
strategically prominent and of less immediate importance, SinoSouth Korean cooperation has a similar potential to arouse
anxiety in Japan. China and South Korea share distrust of
Japanese "militarism" and for the trend in Japanese defense
procurement policies. Beijing's decision to side subtlely with
Seoul in its territorial dispute with Tokyo suggests that Beijing
is aware of Japanese concern and that it is willing to insinuate
greater Chinese-South Korean cooperation to pressure Japan to
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consider Chinese interests. Yet, incautious Chinese cooperation
with South Korea could spur Japan to adopt strategic measures
detrimental to Chinese security and Sino-Japanese cooperation.
China can draw comfort from its cooperative political
relationships with Russia and South Korea, but it must manage
these relationships so as not to harm its equally important
interest in Sino-Japanese cooperation.
The danger in all of these potential developments is that
Chinese policy on domestic or third party issues could elicit the
very Japanese foreign policy that Beijing's bilateral Japan
policy attempts to forestall. Yet, policymaking on all of these
issues has its own domestic and bilateral dynamic. It requires
policymaking sophistication and domestic political confidence to
consider the multitude of cross-cutting interests involved in
"grand strategy" when making policy on such intrinsically
important and politically sensitive issues as Taiwan, Hong Kong,
human rights, Spratly Islands, U.S.-China relations and SinoRussian relations. Moreover, many of these issues, such as the
Taiwan issue and repressing domestic dissent, entail interests
which Chinese leaders consider more important than stable
bilateral relations with Japan and which entail a mixture of
sovereignty and succession politics, thus reducing Beijing's
incentive to consider the implications for Sino-Japanese
relations of policy toward these interests. But whether Beijing
is simply reacting or taking the initiative, its policy on any of
these issues could derail Sino-Japanese cooperation.
Conclusion.
Chinese management of its Japan policy is not only crucial
to vital Chinese interests but also to regional stability. Japan
has the potential both to contribute to Chinese economic
modernization and security and to develop and use regionwide
military, political and economic instruments to retard Chinese
economic development and to undermine Chinese security.
Heightened Sino-Japanese cooperation can underpin regional
stability and economic cooperation, but heightened conflict has
the potential to polarize all of East Asia into competing blocs,
undermining the region's ability to continue its successful
pursuit of economic growth and the development of regional
stability with multilateral institutions of cooperation. Much is
riding on Chinese policy and the course of Sino-Japanese
relations.
To protect Chinese security and maintain Sino-Japanese
cooperation, Beijing must weave together a wide range of
potentially contradictory policies. Its defense policy is a
necessary hedge against the possibility of deteriorated relations
with a superior economic, technological and even military power.

17

But China's defense budget and its acquisition of advanced
foreign weaponry has the potential to elicit Japanese policy
detrimental to Chinese interests. The burden rests on Beijing's
bilateral Japan policy to have a countervailing impact on
bilateral relations. But, Sino-Japanese relations have become
increasingly complex. The end of the Cold War and the decline of
LDP dominance in Japanese domestic politics have undermined
Tokyo's ability to take the long view of Sino-Japanese relations
and to continue to shelve what had been secondary conflicts of
interest. The resulting new points of friction, as well as
enhanced U.S.-Japan strategic cooperation, have complicated
bilateral relations and added an element of doubt to Chinese
confidence in Sino-Japanese cooperation.
Complications in Sino-Japanese relations have elicited a
more outspoken Chinese policy toward Japan. The Chinese media are
once again covering trends considered counterproductive to
Beijing, including alleged revival of militarism and Japanese
defense spending. They have been critical of elements of Japanese
policy toward China, including Tokyo's relationship with Taiwan,
its handling of the yen loan program, and its policy on disputed
territories. Nonetheless, Beijing continues to evaluate favorably
the trend in Japanese foreign policy and its Japan policy
reflects this. It has maintained a low-key approach to conflicts
of interest, trying to caution Japan from adopting contentious
policies, while trying to maintain cooperative relations. Its
bilateral Japan policy reflects the cross-cutting pressures that
Japan poses to Chinese interests.
If Sino-Japanese relations existed in a vacuum, relations
would be relatively easy to manage. But there exists a wide range
of external factors (ranging from Chinese treatment of dissidents
and the Taiwan issue to U.S.-China and Sino-Russian relations)
that could affect Japanese policymaking and redirect the
relationship, despite Chinese intentions to maintain stable
relations. China's control over the course of these issues is, at
times, minimal. At other times, leadership incentive and/or
ability to incorporate China's interest in stable Sino-Japanese
relations into policymaking is minimal. And affecting the entire
spectrum of issues is the fact that Japan is a democracy and
Chinese leaders are celebrated for their inability to consider
the implications of their own behavior for the politics of China
policy in democracies.
Sino-Japanese relations do not exist in a vacuum. Chinese
leaders will have to exercise considerable tolerance, patience,
and sophistication to maintain cooperative relations with Japan
in increasingly complex circumstances. Thus far, they have shown
the ability to develop a Japan policy which responds to the
numerous challenges to Chinese interests. Nonetheless, given the
fact that the challenges will likely grow and relations with
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Japan will likely become more complex, China's Japan policy and
Sino-Japanese relations must be considered one more factor
contributing to the uncertainty of Asia after the Cold War.
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